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ABSTRACT Introduction: Activists mobilize using various protest strategies to advance their demands but few studies analyze protest
events to explain their choice of peaceful, disruptive, and violent methods. This paper argues that when movements have few support-
ers and allies - major resources for mobilization - they privilege violent tactics. Conversely, when mobilizations have more partici-
pants and partners, protests are more likely to use peaceful or disruptive strategies. Materials and methods: The paper uses a mixed
methods research design. From a quantitative perspective, it uses a dataset of 4,700 college student protests in Latin America to test the
theoretical claims with logistic regressions. A case study of protest tactics and resources during the December 2014-January 2015
youth protests in Lima, Peru is used to illustrate how human resources shape the repertoire of contention. This qualitative section uses
evidence from interviews as well as secondary data. Results: The results of the regression analyses partially support the theory, show-
ing that more participants tend to make protests more peaceful and disruptive and less violent. The effect of certain allies, however,
goes against theoretical expectations. As the case study shows, after a relatively violent first march, young activists in Lima organized
themselves on a territorial basis, which both decreased the influence of political parties in the movement and increased the number of
activists and actors involved, making subsequent demonstrations less violent. However, the case study also shows that the presence of
specific political actors is inherently associated with more violent strategies. Discussion: This paper shows how the presence of allies
and the number of demonstrators, as major resources available to social movements, shape the choice of tactics used in protest events.
While more participants and the presence of allies makes events more contained, the evidence also suggests that both very large num-
bers of participants and the addition of disparate actors into a mobilization may promote violence.
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I. Introduction1
Between December 2014 and January 2015, students and young people inLima organized five mass demonstrations against a law enacted on De-cember 11, which limited social security benefits for young workers. On
January 25 - the same day of the last demonstration - the Peruvian Congress re-
pealed the “Ley Pulpín,” as it came to be known.2 These mobilizations showed
very high levels of organization,
The fives marches against the [Ley Pulpín] have symbolized a learning in citi-
zens’ mobilization, and the emergence of young collectives that did not exist be-
fore the law. Demonstrators came from more than 30 districts in Lima and were
divided into 12 zones, with people in charge of order and communications; in the
fifth march there were even delegates in charge of first aid. Labor unions from
both private and public companies also participated, and students from at least
ten private and public universities and colleges in Lima took part even though the
summer break had started in December (Fowks, 2015, author’s translation).
The five protests occurred in a short period of time but only two (the first
and the fourth) experienced violent clashes. What factors determine the types of
strategies used by social movements?
This study seeks to explain why movements choose peaceful, disruptive,
and violent tactics out of their repertoire of contention.3 The main argument is
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that, as protests gather more participants and attract more allies, they tend to
privilege peaceful and disruptive strategies; conversely, when mobilizations are
smaller and have fewer allies, participants resort to violent tactics. This choice
is not a minor issue, as social movement outcomes hinge to a great extent on tac-
tical decisions (Barkan, 1979; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013; Maney, 2012).
In recent years, the tactics of protests have received increased attention from
scholars (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2007). Students of social movements have, for
example, stressed the distinction between peaceful and transgressive actions
(McAdam, 1983; McAdam et al., 2001; Van Dyke et al., 2004), or between vio-
lent and confrontational (Della Porta, 2013) strategies (Koopmans, 1993; Pearl-
man, 2012), while others have delved into the endogenous relationship between
state repression and violent tactics (Della Porta, 2006; Koopmans, 1997). Few
studies however, have considered all types of tactics and systematically as-
sessed why movements choose one type of strategy over others. An important
exception is Medel & Somma (2016), who analyze the determinants of re-
strained and transgressive tactics in Chile. However, since they use multinomial
logistic regressions, they treat tactics as mutually exclusive, when in reality two
or more kinds of strategies can be displayed within the same protest event.4
This study has four sections, after this introduction. The second section
presents the argument and hypotheses, which emphasize allies and increased
numbers as resources that define whether movements privilege peaceful, dis-
ruptive, or violent tactics. The third section uses a dataset of more than 4,700
college student protests in eighteen Latin American countries to test these
claims using logistic regressions, showing that increased size and the presence
of some social groups increase the likelihood of peaceful and disruptive tactics,
while fewer demonstrators and the absence of certain actors are associated with
violent strategies. The fourth section presents a case study of tactics, protest
size, and allies during the December 2014 and January 2015 youth marches
against the so-called “Pulpín” Law in Peru, Lima.5 The final section summa-
rizes the results and presents the study’s implications.
II. Choosing protest tactics: numbers, allies and resources
The main argument of this study is that the amount of resources social
movements possess plays a major role in defining its repertoire of contention.
Resources as a driving force of protests have a longstanding pedigree in the
study of social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Social movements can
use five types of resources: “moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and
material resources” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 117).
This research focuses on the effects of social-organizational and human re-
sources on protest tactics. The former can include intentional resources (created
specifically to advance the movements’ goals) and appropriable ones (which al-
ready exist, but must be seized somehow) (Coleman, 2000). Meanwhile, human
resources refer to the “labor, experience, skills, and expertise” (Edwards & Mc-
Carthy, 2004, p. 127) that activists can provide.
The amount of resources, in turn, determines whether mobilizations follow
what Della Porta & Diani (2006, pp.171-176) call the “logic of numbers” and
the logic of damages” in social movements. The former logic argues that social
movements have a greater social and political impact when their protests are
larger. As Somma & Medel (2019, p. 233) claim,
Large demonstrations are more likely to be covered by the mass media, therefore
getting more attention to movement demands. As more people support the move-
ment, bystanders may be more inclined to think it is worthwhile. Activists
marching by thousands feel empowered and reinforce their emotional connec-
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oppose a public decision they
consider unjust or threatening”
(Della Porta et al., 2017, p.
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tion to the movement. Organizers believe they did a good job and prepare opti-
mistically for the next assault.
In a similar vein, protest size can indicate authorities how much support the
movement has (DeNardo, 1985, p. 36). Strategies that embody the logic of
numbers are those that allow movements to boast their numerical superiority:
marches, demonstrations, petitions, strikes, and sit-ins, among others.
The logic of damages, by contrast, maintains that public opinion, the media,
and politicians may pay more attention to movements when they are more vio-
lent. Indeed, the government may exhibit “additional responsiveness to violent
protest”, which may “provide sufficient compensation for the movement’s
smaller size” (DeNardo, 1985, p. 219). Thus, while not completely mutually ex-
clusive, these two logics tend to operate separately, based on, for instance, the
number of protest participants and the presence of allies.
Although social movement organizations may generate their own resources,
the incorporation of additional assets is critical in determining their actions. As
Edwards & McCarthy (2004, p. 116) claim, “[w]hen movement activists do at-
tempt to create collective action (fielding protests, creating social movement or-
ganizations, and the like) through historical time and across geographical
locations their successes are consistently related to the greater presence of avail-
able resources in their broader environments.” What are the resources that tip
the balance towards peaceful, disruptive or violent strategies?
A major organizational and human resource is people themselves. In fact,
activists tend to prioritize maximizing the number of participants over the num-
ber of protests (Popovic & Miller, 2015, p. 52; Tilly, 2015, p. 370). Protest size
is clearly associated with the repertoire of contention, as “the tactics that activ-
ists decide to use in the context of a massive event will not have the same effec-
tiveness as when the protest only summons a handful of people” (Medel &
Somma, 2016, pp.174-175). As the logic of numbers suggests, numbers by
themselves may draw media attention, influence public opinion, and eventually
shape political and policy outcomes, making violence unnecessary to achieve
social movements’ objectives.
The argument that increased protest size leads to peaceful demonstrators is
not without its detractors, however. Some authors argue that increased numbers
reduce the individual risks of repression, making violent actions less costly
(Granovetter, 1978; Oberschall, 2017; Taylor & Van Dyke, 2007). More partic-
ipants, by piquing the interest of the state, may also lead to more repression,
which may cause activists to react and violence to escalate (Della Porta, 2006;
Koopmans, 1997). In the case of self-determination groups, Cunningham
(2013) finds that relatively larger groups are less likely to use non-violence and
more likely to engage in civil war, vis-à-vis conventional politics. It is rarely the
case, however, that most participants in a large protest event take part in violent
actions - in general, aggression is a property of small groups.
• Hypothesis 1a: increased numbers of protesters have a positive ef-
fect on the likelihood of peaceful tactics.
• Hypothesis 1b: increased numbers of protesters have a positive ef-
fect on the likelihood of disruptive tactics.
• Hypothesis 1c: increased numbers of protesters have a negative
effect on the likelihood of violent tactics.
There are only so many resources that members from the same social move-
ment organization or sector can harness by themselves and from their bases. In-
deed, the involvement of potential allies from other organizations and sectors is
a key dimension of resource availability. The evidence also suggests that move-
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ments in which different types of activists cooperate tend to be more successful
(Gamson, 1990; Steedly & Foley, 1979). As Van Dyke (2003, pp.226-227) ex-
plains, “[c]reating broad coalitions that cut across movement boundaries is a
central means by which movements are able to stage events with a very large
number of participants.” Additional resources from other social actors, in turn,
can shape the choice of protest tactics.
Resources from other groups must be coopted or appropriated in order to be
used. As Edwards & McCarthy (2004, p. 134) explain, “cooptation refers to the
transparent, permitted borrowing of resources that have already been aggre-
gated by such groups. Appropriation refers to the surreptitious exploitation of
the previously aggregated resources of other groups.” Recruiting professors for
a college student demonstration, using a labor union’s headquarters to organize
a march for pension reform, and feminists coordinating with students to stage
sit-ins in high schools in favor of a feminist mobilization are all examples of
these mechanisms being used to access additional resources.
Some authors have argued that the tactics employed by specific social
groups are inherently contained or aggressive. For example, the labor move-
ment tends to be disruptive because it can interrupt economic production
(through strikes or slowdowns) with relative ease vis-à-vis other groups
(McAdam, 1982; Schwartz, 1988). The unemployed in Argentina, for example,
tend to use coercive tactics because of their lack of political resources (Freyre,
2014, p. 43). The literature also claims that some sectors are inherently more
peaceful or violent depending on their level of political capital (Bernstein, 1997;
Piven & Cloward, 1979; Van Dyke et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2008). For exam-
ple, inhabitants from a poor neighborhood may use more transgressive tactics to
voice their demands because they do not possess the same level of influence as
their counterparts in more affluent districts. While this may be true of specific
social movement sectors, the addition of virtually any group into a mobilization
may add extra resources or capital and will cause its tactics to follow the logic of
numbers rather than the logic of damages.6
Why would allies lend their resources to other actors? Movements often
modify their collective action frame by including the demands of their allies
(Benford & Snow, 2000). Thus, additional demands may cause mobilizations to
become larger and more numerous, which may promote their resonance. Some
actors may also decide to support protests targeting their adversaries. Scholars
have previously argued, for instance, that linkages between social movements
and opposition parties can promote large-scale protests and the achievement of
policy outcomes (Almeida, 2010; Stearns & Almeida, 2004; Su, 2015). Strong
political oppositions, for example, can promote mobilization to destabilize their
adversaries in government (Morgenstern et al., 2008, p. 183).
Incorporating other types of participants requires formulating collective ac-
tion frames that are appealing to different actors (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992).
This means not only adding (often disparate) demands together, but also giving
up ideological conformity and extreme demands, which are associated with
more transgressive tactics (McAdam, 1986; Medel & Somma, 2016). As Tilly
& Tarrow explain, social movements sometimes choose to substitute “more ex-
treme goals and more robust tactics for more moderate ones in order to maintain
the interest of their supporters and attract new ones” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015,
p.3). Thus, when a movement does not have allies, its tactics will be more vio-
lent, relative to movements with several types of protest participants, which
tend to be more contained.
• Hypothesis 2a: The presence of other actors increases the likeli-
hood of peaceful tactics
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• Hypothesis 2b: The presence of other actors increases the likeli-
hood disruptive tactics.
• Hypothesis 2c: The presence of other actors decreases the likeli-
hood of violent tactics.
The repertoire of contention, therefore, is defined to a great extent by the re-
sources available to activists. In particular, the number of demonstrators and the
presence of allies from other social groups cause protests to follow the logic of
numbers rather than the logic of damages, making them more peaceful or dis-
ruptive and less violent.
III. Statistical Analyses of Student Protest Tactics in Latin America
In this section, I use the Latin American Student Protest Dataset (LASPD).7
This dataset includes 4,717 different protest events with college student partici-
pants8 in eighteen Latin American countries, between the years 2000 and 2012.
The events listed on the LASPD are based on the “Chronologies of Social Con-
flict,” which were monthly reports compiled by the Latin American Social Ob-
servatory (Observatorio Social de América Latina, OSAL, 2012). Although the
LASPD focuses on a specific social group,9 it includes an unprecedented num-
ber of countries, events and variables - including protest size and the presence of
other types of participants - so it is a useful resource to analyze the choice of
protest tactics across time and space. For the purposes of this study, the unit of
analysis is each protest event.
III.1 Variables
The dependent variables are the types of tactics used in the mobilizations.
The LASPD covers twenty-one different protest tactics, which are aggregated
in this study into three different types of strategies: peaceful, disruptive, and vi-
olent tactics. Peaceful and disruptive tactics are assumed to be more akin to the
logic of numbers, while violent ones are better associated to the logic of dam-
ages. It is important to note that these categories are not mutually exclusive: for
example, the same protest may involve a peaceful march, a disruptive road-
block, and isolated violent attacks between demonstrators and counter demon-
strators.
Table 1 shows the frequency of these different tactics and types. Peaceful
tactics are by far the most common, with almost 72% of all events using them.
Disruptive tactics are also relatively frequent (about 37% of all events), while
violent tactics are rare, with just 11% of all events using these strategies. This
distribution is also reflected when protest tactics are disaggregated: the five
most common strategies are marches, demonstrations, roadblocks, and sit-ins at
schools; meanwhile, the five least common tactics are attacks on bystanders,
funas, attacks on other protesters, use of weapons, and attacks on private prop-
erty.
The independent variables are grouped into two dimensions of protest.
These dimensions are the size of protests (in terms of number of participants),
and the presence or absence of additional social actors in the mobilization. The
size of protests is measured using an ordinal scale: a handful of participants
(1.8% of all events); ten to 49 participants, (9.1%), 50 to 100 protesters (7.4%),
hundreds (20.5%), thousands (16.6%), and tens of thousands or more (9.1%).10
In terms of additional actors, several groups are sometimes allied with col-
lege students: political party members (present in approximately 17.2% of all
protests), high school students (6.7%), college faculty (13.4%), primary and
secondary teachers (8.3%), labor (29%), peasants (7.2%), and indigenous and
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Afro-descendant people (4.1%). While the literature argues that some groups
may decide to carry out more disruptive or violent actions based on their eco-
nomic role (McAdam, 1982; Schwartz, 1988) and level of political capital
(Bernstein, 1997; Medel & Somma, 2016; Piven & Cloward, 1979; Walker et
al., 2008), I expect that the addition of any of these groups will increase student
activists’ resources, turning their repertoire of contention in favor of the logic of
numbers and against the logic of damages. A variable denoting when none of
these other actors is present is also included. The absence of any allies is ex-
pected to have a negative effect on the likelihood of more contained forms of
mobilization due to the relative absence of resources.
The analysis also incorporates several control variables. These variables
correspond to three dimensions of protests events: targets, demands, and loca-
tion. The variables related to targets are whether the protests focus on the gov-
ernment or colleges. The government is by far the most common target, with
approximately 70% of mobilizations targeting political authorities. The college
variable is also included because about 27% of college student mobilizations
are aimed at their own institutions, making them the second most common tar-
get. The expectation is that activists are more likely to use violent tactics against
targets that do not possess the capacity of the state to respond with repression
(Walker et al., 2008). Events targeting the government will be, therefore, rela-
tively contained in their strategies. Tactics against colleges, on the other hand,
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Table 1 - Frequency of peaceful, disruptive, and violent tactics in Latin American college
student protests





Public statement 418 8.86
Assembly 287 6.08







Sit-in (school) 636 13.48
Sit-in (elsewhere) 168 3.56
Roadblock 702 14.88
Interruption of public activity 117 2.48
Funa 51 1.08
Self-destructive acts 137 2.90
Violent 528 11.19
Attacks on public property 100 2.12
Attacks on private property 89 1.89
Weapons 83 1.76
Attacks on security forces 174 3.69
Attacks on bystanders 15 0.32
Attacks on other protesters 73 1.55
Number of observations: 4.717
Source: author’s elaboration.
therefore, included to the
model to keep these
observations in the analysis.
will tend to be disruptive or violent because college authorities, which are not
subject to public opinion like political elites, are less likely to be swayed by
peaceful demonstrations.
A second set of control variables is the types of demands advanced during
the mobilizations. These include broader political (made in 15.8% of all events)
and postmaterialist demands (feminist, environmental, sexual, ethical, and ani-
mal rights, etc., 5.1%). Also included are the more student-specific claims re-
lated to education costs (free education and student debt, among others, 13.4%),
education support (scholarships, student bus fares, housing and meals, 6.2%),
and autonomy (autonomy for public universities, student participation in col-
lege governance, etc., 6,3%). According to Medel and Somma (2016, p. 178),
radical demands, which they define as “demands that require great institutional
reforms to me bet, or outright antisystemic demands”, promote riskier, costlier
and more violent demands. Relatively radical demands like antigovernment
protests in Venezuela, or higher education policy reforms in Chile may be,
therefore, associated with more disruptive or violent forms of mobilization.
The location of the events may also have an effect on the repertoire of con-
tention. More specifically, the events staged in capital cities may be more visi-
ble (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2007; Van Dyke et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2008),
making the logic of damages less appealing. Thus, capital cities (where 42.8%
of events took place), may be more likely to experience more peaceful and dis-
ruptive demonstrations.
Finally, two more variables are included for methodological purposes. First,
each strategy category is used as a regressor of the other two to make sure the ef-
fects of the other independent variables are not influenced by the other tactics
present in the events. Additionally, since the three different coders worked on
the LASPD, a coder variable is also included to make sure the results are not a
function of who coded the events.11
III.2 Results and robustness12
Data from the LASPD is regressed using two model specifications.13 Table 2
describes the results of six models: the first three are logistic regression models
of peaceful, disruptive and violent protest tactics (I); the last three are multilevel
logistic regression models (II). The first logistic models may be ignoring time-
and country-specific dynamics of students’ repertoires of contention. Unfortu-
nately, introducing countries as fixed effects into the models causes multi-
collinearity issues. Multilevel models with country-year and country random
intercepts are, therefore, used as an alternative to account for these sources of
non-independence. In the type II models, protest events are nested within coun-
try-years, which in turn are nested within countries. All models use robust stan-
dard errors. The effects of the independent variables in the type II regressions
are similar to those in the type I models. The effects of all but two variables of
interest are consistent in both model specifications, which suggests that the re-
sults are relatively robust to different model specifications.14
The effects of size on protests tactics confirm Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c. In-
deed, increased protest size generally has large, positive and statistically signifi-
cant effects on the likelihoods of peaceful and disruptive tactics. The number of
participants also has significant but negative effect on the likelihood of violent
ones. For example, compared to the smallest size category (a handful of demon-
strators), the presence of thousands of participants increases the odds of peace-
ful tactics by about 20 times and that of disruptive tactics 22 times, while it
decreases the odds of violent strategies almost 72%. Interestingly, compared to
a handful, the effect on violent tactics of tens of thousands or more demonstra-
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specific countries, so this
variable is highly correlated
with the country variable.
Coders also varied
significantly in terms of
assigning missing values to
the protest size variable.
12 Data and replications codes
are available on the author’s
website.
13 The analyses were carried
out using STATA 15
(StataCorp, 2017).
14 The significance level of
the effects of high school
students and labor are not
consistent across the logistic
(I) and the multilevel logit (II)
models.
8/18 Revista de Sociologia e Política v. 28, n. 76
Table 2 - Effects of protest size and actors on the strategies used in college student protests
Logistic Models (I) Multilevel Logistic Models (II)
Peaceful Disruptive Violent Peaceful Disruptive Violent
Size (reference: handful)
10-49 1.524 7.612*** 0.354*** 1.527 8.142*** 0.323***
(0.398) (2.796) (0.0859) (0.612) (3.736) (0.119)
50-100 4.791*** 21.85*** 0.144*** 4.924*** 23.20*** 0.133***
(1.335) (8.473) (0.0439) (2.112) (10.81) (0.0437)
Hundreds 7.426*** 20.16*** 0.250*** 7.959*** 22.28*** 0.271***
(1.905) (7.451) (0.0612) (3.454) (11.30) (0.0823)
Thousands 20.47*** 21.54*** 0.285*** 24.61*** 24.28*** 0.324***
(5.991) (8.226) (0.0749) (12.31) (12.87) (0.102)
Tens of Thousands 38.95*** 54.08*** 0.803 42.50*** 61.36*** 0.921
(14.20) (21.18) (0.227) (26.05) (35.49) (0.347)
Not enough information 4.402*** 17.52*** 0.229*** 4.593*** 19.89*** 0.217***
(1.090) (6.430) (0.0535) (2.120) (8.487) (0.0595)
Additional Actors
None 0.551*** 1.135 0.876 0.575*** 1.203 0.899
(0.0957) (0.151) (0.147) (0.110) (0.205) (0.212)
Party members 1.439* 0.840 0.893 1.517** 0.837 1.051
(0.296) (0.110) (0.151) (0.298) (0.123) (0.262)
High school students 1.476 1.349* 1.849*** 1.442* 1.290 1.619
(0.379) (0.218) (0.347) (0.293) (0.231) (0.572)
Faculty 0.858 0.909 0.512*** 0.880 0.943 0.517***
(0.162) (0.124) (0.109) (0.119) (0.192) (0.126)
Teachers 2.035** 1.264 0.634** 2.256*** 1.193 0.663**
(0.586) (0.184) (0.141) (0.619) (0.279) (0.115)
Labor 1.080 0.958 0.750* 1.137 0.978 0.783
(0.182) (0.112) (0.115) (0.243) (0.138) (0.195)
Peasants 0.563** 0.929 0.599* 0.523** 0.940 0.529**
(0.163) (0.165) (0.167) (0.136) (0.161) (0.170)
Indigenous and Afrodescendant people 1.899* 1.124 1.053 1.837** 1.125 0.990
(0.719) (0.252) (0.315) (0.493) (0.234) (0.190)
Targets
Government 1.567*** 1.491*** 0.893 1.572*** 1.446*** 0.858
(0.201) (0.168) (0.115) (0.226) (0.161) (0.108)
Colleges 0.790* 2.848*** 0.743** 0.770** 2.907*** 0.809
(0.103) (0.338) (0.110) (0.102) (0.400) (0.165)
Demands
Political 1.259 0.758** 0.889 1.313 0.790 0.781
(0.213) (0.0920) (0.129) (0.242) (0.120) (0.124)
Postmaterialist 2.426** 0.560*** 0.577* 2.552 0.536** 0.564*
(0.890) (0.122) (0.180) (1.547) (0.162) (0.174)
Costs 1.145 0.900 0.757* 1.240 0.914 0.743*
(0.161) (0.104) (0.120) (0.167) (0.139) (0.129)
tors is not significant, which suggests that their effects are similar. Overall,
however, increased protest size is positively associated with the logic of num-
bers, while tactics associated with fewer participants tend to follow the logic of
damages.
The evidence lends partial support to the Hypotheses dealing with the pres-
ence of other actors (2a, 2b, and 2c). Most of the effects are in the expected di-
rection, but only some of them are statistically significant. The absence of any
other actors has a negative effect on the use of peaceful strategies (confirming
Hypothesis 1a), but its effect is not significant on disruptive or violent tactics.
The effect of peasants also goes against expectations, as their presence de-
creases the likelihood of both peaceful and violent tactics, which may be ex-
plained by their low levels of political capital (Bernstein, 1997; Somma &
Medel, 2019). Although workers would be expected to have a positive effect on
the use of disruptive strategies (McAdam, 1982; Medel & Somma, 2016;
Schwartz, 1988), their presence only reduces the likelihood of violent tactics.
The effect of additional actors, therefore, while not completely consistent, sug-
gests that they add resources that veer movements towards the logic of numbers,
rather than the logic of damages.
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Logistic Models (I) Multilevel Logistic Models (II)
Peaceful Disruptive Violent Peaceful Disruptive Violent
Support 1.171 1.081 1.157 1.230 1.023 1.054
(0.207) (0.162) (0.245) (0.195) (0.194) (0.240)
Autonomy 1.158 1.631*** 1.341* 1.256 1.687* 1.145
(0.212) (0.278) (0.238) (0.235) (0.494) (0.197)
Other tactics
Peaceful 0.0295*** 0.174*** 0.0271*** 0.178***
(0.00332) (0.0319) (0.00612) (0.0600)
Disruptive 0.0277*** 0.388*** 0.0240*** 0.394***
(0.00329) (0.0723) (0.00609) (0.116)
Violent 0.161*** 0.394*** 0.152*** 0.371***
(0.0277) (0.0717) (0.0440) (0.112)
Capital City 1.338*** 0.973 0.852 1.363*** 0.871 1.051
(0.134) (0.0815) (0.0847) (0.164) (0.116) (0.150)
Coder (reference: Coder 1)
Coder 2 0.333*** 0.774** 5.499*** 0.329*** 0.787* 3.814***
(0.0537) (0.0955) (1.763) (0.0361) (0.109) (0.750)
Coder 3 0.336*** 1.433** 6.005*** 0.316*** 1.444 3.878***
(0.0618) (0.205) (2.013) (0.0494) (0.363) (1.140)
Constant 8.523*** 0.259*** 0.596 8.570*** 0.246*** 0.547
(2.868) (0.106) (0.257) (4.446) (0.113) (0.234)
Observations 4.717 4.717 4.717 4.717 4.717 4.717
Number of country-years (random inter-
cepts)
227 227 227
Number of countries (random intercepts) 18 18 18
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Obs: Odds Ratios reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 2 - Cont.
The effect of some control variables is also statistically significant. In terms
of the location of events, staging protests in the capital city is associated with a
34% increase in the odds of peaceful tactics. Since the media and political elites
may pay more attention to events happening in, say, the capital city of Buenos
Aires than in a provincial town in Patagonia, the evidence suggests that the
“logic of damages” may be more appealing away from the centers of power.
Among the demand variables, postmaterialist claims have a clear pacifying ef-
fect: these demands are associated with a 143% increase in the odds of peaceful
tactics,15 and a 44 and 42% decrease in the odds disruptive and violent tactics,
respectively. Other demands affect only some types of tactics: political de-
mands decrease the odds of disruptive strategies, while demands for autonomy
increase the likelihood of both disruptive and violent methods. Making claims
about education costs decreases the likelihood of violent strategies - in line with
the finding that these demands are associated with larger protests (Disi Pavlic,
2016). The use of other types of strategies in the same event is consistently neg-
ative and statistically significant across all models, indicating that, while differ-
ent types of tactics may overlap in the same event, activists tend to choose
specific types of tactics from their repertoire of contention. This negative effect
is particularly strong on the co-occurrence of peaceful and disruptive tactics: the
use of one strategy decreases the odds of the other by 97% in both cases.
III.3 Postestimation
Fitting the logistic models (I) on Table 2, I estimate the predicted probabili-
ties of peaceful, disruptive, and violent tactics by the protest size variable and
the statistically significant additional actor variables.16 Figure 1 shows the pre-
dicted probabilities of the three types of tactics by each category of the size vari-
able.17 The probability of peaceful tactics grows as the number of participants
increases, going from 51% with a handful of demonstrators to 98% at tens of
thousands or more, in line with the logic of numbers, and supporting Hypothesis
1a. In the case of disruptive tactics, the number probability tends to increase
with protest size, lending support to Hypothesis 1b. Meanwhile, the probabili-
ties of violent tactics indicate that the relationship between protest size and these
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Source: Author’s elaboration.
Figure 1 - Predicted Probabilities of Tactics by Protest Size, with 95% CIs
15 This result is not
statistically significant in the
multilevel logistic model,
however.
16 The rest of the variables are
used at their means. All the
results are statistically
significant.
17 The predicted probabilities
when there is not enough
information about the number
of protesters suggests that
these events are mid-sized.
tactics is somewhat U-shaped: the two categories with the highest predicted
probabilities are those with the smallest (23%) and largest (20%) numbers of
participants. Violent tactics, therefore, are more common in small protests of
likeminded, radical activists, but that they also tend to occur in the largest ones,
perhaps due to increased state repression (Della Porta, 2006; Koopmans, 1997)
or decreased risks for individual activists of performing violent actions (Grano-
vetter, 1978; Oberschall, 2017; Taylor & Van Dyke, 2007). Larger numbers
may, for example, increase anonymity, which decreases the danger of commit-
ting violent acts.
Table 3 shows the predicted probabilities of protest tactics by the additional
actor variables that were statistically significant across the first three models.
The results show that the presence of allies increases the probability of peaceful
tactics, while it decreases the predicted probabilities of violent strategies. When
the only actor present is college students, the probability of using peaceful tac-
tics is about 83%, while the presence of any additional actor increases that prob-
ability to approximately 90%, which supports Hypothesis 2a. The presence of
peasants, however, make peaceful tactics less likely (but they also decrease the
probability of violent actions). The predicted probabilities of disruptive actions
increase from 34% without high schoolers to approximately 42% when they are
present. These results indicate that the effect of additional actors on tactics in
college student demonstrations is generally pacifying, but that it by varies sig-
nificantly by the type of actor. The probability of violent actions decreases with
the presence of all actors - with the exception of high schoolers.
IV. Tactics and Human Resources during the Demonstrations Against the Ley Pulpín
This section analyzes the way resources shaped the tactics used in the mobi-
lization against the so-called Ley Pulpín in Peru. This law, passed on December
11, 2014 reduced the mandatory job benefits of 18 to 24-year-old Peruvians.
According to its proponents, the goal of the law was reducing that segment’s un-
employment and informal employment rates (Ford Cole, 2018, p. 50) but in re-
ality the law followed a trend of reforms in Peru making labor more flexible and
unregulated (Fernández-Maldonado, 2015). The movement included several
different actors but most of the participants were college students (Fowks,
2015). After five demonstrations, the government repealed the law on January
25, 2015. Variation in the explanatory and dependent variables in a short time
span within the same movement provides an excellent opportunity to assess the
causal impact (Gerring & McDermott, 2007) of resources on tactics.
The evidence discussed below is based on eighteen in-depth interviews car-
ried out by the author between February and May of 2015 in Lima. Interviewees
included current and former student leaders and activists, faculty, and univer-
sity and government officials. Their insights are used to analyze the move-
ments’ dynamics. This primary evidence is complemented with newspaper
articles and other secondary data, which registered some basic facts about the
Pulpín rebellion.
IV.1 The Evolution of the tactics used during the youth movement against the Ley Pulpín
The movement consisted of five main episodes of protest (Fowks, 2015; La
República, 2015). The first march, which was organized organically through
social media, took place on December 19, eight days after the bill was passed.
About four thousand people gathered in downtown Lima and marched towards
the upscale district of Miraflores. The incidents that took place during the pro-
test demonstrate its organizers’ lack of experience:
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The first march against the [Ley Pulpín]was a total chaos. On the one hand, the
mass of young people moved about through different streets of Lima with very
little organization which, combined with police repression, resulted in more than
twenty young people being arrested, and in a large number of injured persons, in-
cluding a person ran over by a police patrol (Díaz Zanelli, 2015).
The second march on December 23 gathered more than 10,000 people, and
included demonstrations outside the headquarters of the National Confedera-
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Table 3 - Predicted Probabilities of Tactics by Additional Actors, with 95% CIs
Additional actors Tactic Type
Peaceful Disruptive Violent


































Observations 4.717 4.717 4.717
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Obs: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
tion of Private Business Institutions (CONFIEP), an interest group which had
lobbied in favor of the law.18 The third march was on December 29, and had a
similar number of participants and actions. The fourth march occurred on Janu-
ary 15 and headed towards the National Congress. Demonstrators presented
congressional officials with a list of demands. During this event “violence
marked the day, during which young people denounced the presence of hooded
figures” (La República, 2015). The Minister of Interior attributed the violence
in an otherwise peaceful demonstration to the presence of certain labor organi-
zations and activists from the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights
(Movimiento por la Amnistía y los Derechos Fundamentales, MOVADEF) (La
Prensa, 2015; Mendoza, 2015).19 When Congress decided to debate the law,
President Ollanta Humala used a national television address to defend the bill.
However, public opinion had already turned against the Ley Pulpín and had a
very positive opinion of the movement (GFK, 2015), so the President’s own
party announced it would vote to repeal the law on January 25 (Fernández-
Maldonado, 2015). Finally, the law was repealed on January 27, the same day as
last of demonstration, which gathered two thousand young protesters.
These protests were relatively unusual in the Peruvian context (Ford Cole,
2018, p. 49). This was the first time a social movement was able to thwart a la-
bor reform since the implementation of a market economy in the country in the
1990s (Fernández-Maldonado, 2015, pp.166-167). Unlike other demonstra-
tions by students and young people since the return to democracy in the 2000s,
the protests were massive and largely peaceful, and had an important amount of
first-time and low-income participants (Cavero, 2015). The relatively contained
character of the movement can be found in the resources activists were able to
amass. Initially, opposition parties were important contributors, but most of
their resources came from the way young activists adapted their organization,
which resulted in larger and more peaceful demonstrations.
IV.2 The minor role of parties, and the advantages of autonomy
Political parties from the opposition, which had a strong presence and lead-
ership in the early stages of the mobilization through the “18D” coordinating
group (named after the day before the first march), attempted to “appropriate”
(Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 134) the movement. Participants in the move-
ment accused political parties like PCP-PR20 and PAP21 of attempting to apara-
tear (coopt) the movement for their own purposes, and in particular to take
advantage of the movement’s popularity in preparation for the presidential and
congressional elections of 2016 (Chávez, 2015).22 Other leaders, however, were
able to organize the mobilization in such a way that party interests could not
capture the movement.
Members of PAP attempted to increase their influence - and prevent other
parties controlling the mobilizations - after the first march by proposing to as-
sign the organization of the movement in Lima and Callao to fourteen different
zonas (zones).23 Zonas were geographically disaggregated, and organized
movement participants into groups of residents from contiguous municipalities
(Paucar Albino, 2017). The initiative backfired for the PAP: the rest of the
movement, including several university organizations, which had a strong
anti-party stance,24 decided to organize the movement so that that no single par-
ticipating organization could appropriate the zonas (García & Vela, 2015). An-
other objective was to weed out infiltrators, who were accused of having
connections to the police and causing public disorder during the demonstra-
tions.25
Political party activists, therefore, were forced to participate in their roles as
zona residents, and the connection between the movement and parties was
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18 This is the first time the
CONFIEP has been directly
targeted by protests in Peru
(Fernández-Maldonado, 2015,
p. 142, fn. 2; Fowks, 2015).
19 MOVADEF is a political
movement that is, according to
several observers, a
continuation of the Shining
Path terrorist organization
(Pighi Bel, 2017; Salazar &
Tamara, 2011; Sandoval,
2012, p. 1).
20 Communist Party of Peru -
Red Fatherland. Not to be
confused with the Communist
Party of Peru - Shining Path.
21 Peruvian Aprista Party. In




22 Interview with Álvaro
Vidal. Student leader,
Pontifical Catholic University
of Peru (PUCP) and UNMSM.
May 13, 2015.
23 Interview with César Ames.
President, Universidad
Nacional Mayor de San
Marcos (UNMSM) Social
Sciences Student Union. The
idea also arose out of the
unsuccessful experience in the
first demonstration (Díaz
Zanelli, 2015).
24 Interview with Lilia
Ramírez. Lawyer, Legal
weakened. Several sources attribute the movement’s legitimacy and accep-
tance, its ability to summon large crowds, and its ultimate success in repealing
the Ley Pulpín to the distance the organization took from formal politics and
parties.26 Indeed, movement members adopted an increasingly anti-party stance
at meetings and during the demonstrations.27 Parties and party members, there-
fore, participated in the mobilizations against the Ley Pulpín but had to accept a
secondary role to avoid being left out.28
In sum, the main resource the movement was its organizational strength,
which was “unprecedented” (Díaz Zanelli, 2015) by Peruvian standards. Zonas
were devised to work in a horizontal, nonhierarchical way, with all decisions
made in open assemblies. All members were encouraged (and sometimes com-
pelled if they had been quiet for too long) to voice their opinions. The leaders
acted only as spokespersons and had to rotate periodically. Its horizontal nature
also promoted the incorporation of many members of college student and work-
ers’ unions, in addition to young people (the targets of the Ley Pulpín). This or-
ganizational structure increased the number of participants, and reduced clashes
with the police after the first march.29 As mentioned above, the only exception
occurred in the fourth march, when some alleged members of MOVADEF and
other political groups attacked security forces. They threw paint, rocks and
other objects when the police attempted to prevent demonstrators from reaching
Congress (La Prensa, 2015), which resulted in dozens of arrests and several in-
jured police officers.30 However, most of the tactics used by the movement in-
cluded peaceful and sometimes disruptive acts (resulting in some arrests) like
demonstrations at Lima’s Plaza Mayor (Main Square) with a Peruvian flag,
blockading urban highways, staging protests in the city’s financial district, and
displaying banners in shopping malls (Díaz Zanelli, 2015).
The qualitative evidence is aligned with the quantitative results. The case
study shows that the positive effect of protest size is due to the larger organiza-
tional capacity required to gather more participants. At the same time, the vio-
lent actions during the fourth march suggest that “[t]he cost to an individual of
joining a riot declines as riot size increases, since the probability of being appre-
hended is smaller the larger the number involved” (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1422).
The case study also suggests that, in order for the effect of additional actors to be
positive, their inclusion must be coordinated - violent actions were allegedly
carried out by “infiltrators” (La Prensa, 2014). As Piven & Cloward (1995, p.
158) observe, “[i]t is not that disruption and violence are never employed by
formally organized groups; it is that, in general, organization constrains against
such tactics.”
V. Conclusion
This article shows how the presence of allies and the number of demonstra-
tors, as major resources available to social movements, shape the choice of tac-
tics used in protest events. Unlike other works, which analyze the types of
protest tactics as discrete choices (Medel & Somma, 2016), this work recog-
nizes the fact the different types of tactics may occur in the same demonstration.
In short, it argues that protests with both more participants and allies should fol-
low the logic of numbers, while reduced participants and the absence of allies
make mobilizations more likely to follow the logic of damages.
The quantitative analyses demonstrate that size is an important determinant
of the repertoire of contention. Larger numbers of participants are associated
with higher likelihoods of peaceful and disruptive tactics, while it decreases the
odds of more violent methods. At the same time, however, very large protests
also tend to experience more violent actions than medium-sized events (but
fewer than the smallest demonstrations). Thus, results show that the factors as-
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Defense Institute (IDL).
March 3, 2015.
25 Interview with César Ames.
26 Others, however, believed
that the movement would not




27 Interview with Lilia
Ramírez.
28 The movement also
incorporated labor unions, but
was not subjected to them
either (Fernández-Maldonado,
2015, p. 142).
29 This undermines an
alternative explanation, which
argues that activists prefer
peaceful tactics because
violent ones preclude higher
participation - in other words,
that tactics affects numbers
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013;
Schock, 2005). The Pulpín
rebellion shows that tactics
within the same movement
became more peaceful after
becoming better organized,
more numerous and with the
presence of more
organizations.
30 Most participants did not
engage with the police
violently, however, and about
twenty of them convinced
security forces to let them
deliver a letter to
representatives in Congress
(La Prensa, 2015). The
activists using violence also
attacked other demonstrators
(Mendoza, 2015).
sociated with using, say, peaceful strategies may sometimes overlap with those
associated with violent tactics.
The effect of additional actors is less clear-cut. The absence of any actor has
a negative effect on the use of peaceful strategies, but its effect on disruptive and
violent tactics is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, the presence of some
specific actors had the expected effect on all types of protests; participation by
other groups had the expected effect but only on one or two tactic variables; fi-
nally, a few actors did not conform to expectations. The effect of these actors
(high school students and peasants) is in line, however, with the argument the
resource-poor groups are less likely to use peaceful actions, and more prone to
resort to violent tactics (Medel & Somma, 2016; Piven & Cloward, 1979; Van
Dyke et al., 2004). The evidence, therefore, supports the argument that de-
creased political cohesiveness increases the use of violent tactics (Pearlman,
2012) - both very large numbers of participants and the addition of disparate ac-
tors into a mobilization may undermine its cohesiveness.
The case study of the movement against the Ley Pulpín in Peru in 2014-2015
illustrates how participants, allies, and organizational resources in general
caused these mobilizations to be relatively contained. After an unsuccessful,
disorganized, and violent first march, the movement was organized geographi-
cally and horizontally. While opposition parties were the ones initially organiz-
ing the protests, young organizers feared that the parties would appropriate the
movement’s resources for electoral purposes, and therefore began to organize
themselves autonomously. This horizontal organization promoted the recruit-
ment of both more participants and more organizations. The only exception was
the participation of certain political groups like MOVADEF, whose involve-
ment in the fourth march a led small number of participants to attack security
forces outside the Peruvian Congress. Thus, in general, this movement’s tactics
tended to become more contained as it began to follow the logic of numbers,
acting independently from particular interests, and amassing more human and
organizational resources from additional individual participants and social or-
ganizations.
Rodolfo Disi Pavlic (rdisi@uct.cl) holds a Ph.D. in Government from UT Austin and is Assistant Professor in the Department
of Sociology and Political Science at UCT.
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Eligiendo del repertorio de contención: Evidencia de protestas estudiantiles en América Latina
RESUMEN Introducción: Los activistas se movilizan utilizando distintas estrategias de protesta para avanzar sus demandas, pero
pocos estudios analizan los eventos de protesta para explicar su elección de métodos pacíficos, disruptivos o violentos. Este artículo
argumenta que cuando los movimientos tienen pocos partidarios y aliados - principales recursos para la movilización - éstos
privilegian tácticas violentas. Por otra parte, cuando las movilizaciones tienen más participantes y colaboradores, la probabilidad de
que las protestas usen estrategias pacíficas o disruptivas aumenta. Materiales y métodos: Este artículo usa un diseño de investigación
de métodos mixtos. Desde una perspectiva cuantitativa, se utiliza una base de datos de 4.700 eventos de protesta de estudiantes de
educación superior en América Latina para evaluar los argumentos teóricos a través de regresiones logísticas. Se realiza un estudio de
caso sobre las tácticas de protesta y recursos durante las movilizaciones de jóvenes en Lima, Perú de diciembre de 2014-enero de
2016 para ilustrar cómo los recursos humanos moldean el repertorio de contención. Esta sección cualitativa usa evidencia de
entrevistas así como de fuentes secundarias. Resultados: Los resultados de los análisis de regresión apoyan parcialmente la teoría,
demostrando que más participantes tienden a volver las protestas más pacíficas y disruptivas y menos violentas. El efecto de ciertos
aliados, sin embargo, va en contra de las expectativas teóricas. Como muestra el estudio de caso, luego de una primera marcha
relativamente violenta, los jóvenes activistas limeños se organizaron territorialmente, disminuyendo la influencia de los partidos
políticos en el movimiento a la vez que aumentaron la cantidad de activistas y actores involucrados, volviendo a las manifestaciones
posteriores menos violentas. El estudio de caso, sin embargo, también evidencia que la presencia de ciertos actores políticos está
inherentemente asociada con estrategias más violentas. Discusión: Este artículo demuestra que la presencia de aliados y el número de
participantes, como principales recursos disponibles para los movimientos sociales, moldean la elección de las tácticas usadas en los
eventos de protesta. Aunque más participantes y la presencia de aliados vuelve a los eventos más contenidos, la evidencia también
sugiere que una gran cantidad de participantes y la suma de actores dispares en una movilización pueden promover la violencia.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Eventos de protesta; tácticas; movimientos no violentos; protestas violentas; repertorio de contención
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